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Question Two. Whether Christ is a Two
50. Second I ask whether Christ is a two.
51. That he is.
Because Christ, as he is man, is something (according to the Decretal On Heretics [n.25 supra]), and, as he is God, he is something; therefore, as he is man, he is not the same ‘something’ that is God, but another something - and likewise, as he is God, he is not the same something as is man, because then he would be God by humanity; therefore he is different somethings. Therefore he is two.
52. Further, Damascene ch.51, “the whole [totus] Christ is God, but he is not only God;”57 from this follows, ‘if he is not only God, then he is God and something other than God’ - and so he is two. The consequence is plain from a likeness, that if a man runs and not only a man runs, then something other than a man runs; therefore the like holds on the part of the predicate [cf. n.62 infra].
53. Further, according to the Philosopher Metaphysics 5.6.1016b35-17a3 ‘On One’, difference in species entails difference in number, as difference in genus entails difference in species; but here there is a quasi-specific difference of natures; therefore a numerical difference - and so two.
54. Further, as the masculine gender [e.g. totus] belongs to the supposit, so the neuter gender [e.g. totum] belongs to the nature, and conversely, according to Damascene [n.52]; so, since there are two natures in Christ, he can be said to be ‘two’ in the neuter, just as, because of unity of supposit, he can be said to be ‘one’ in the masculine.
55. The reasoning is confirmed because, as the three divine persons are said to be ‘three’ in the masculine, so they are said to be ‘one’ in the neuter, because of unity of nature; therefore the opposite here [sc. Christ is ‘one’ in the masculine but ‘two’ in the neuter].
56. On the contrary:
Christ is nothing but God and man, and these are not two, because God is man;a therefore Christ is not a two.
a.a [Interpolation] and every predication is made in respect of some unity, whether per se or simply or per accidens; therefore no duality.
57. Further, Athanasius in his Creed [Quicumque], “Yet Christ is not two but one.”
58. Again Hilary On the Trinity 9 n.40 [“And I ask whether the Son of man and the Son of God are the same. And since the Son of man is not other and the Son of God is not other (‘For the Word was made flesh’, John 1.14), and since he who is Son of God is also Son of man, I require who is the God glorified in the Son of man who is also Son of God”].
59. And for other good authorities, pro and con, see Lombard Sentences 3 d.7 ch.1 nn.4-13.
I. To the Question
60. To the question I say that the conclusion is manifest, that Christ is not a ‘two’ in the masculine, because he is not two persons, for then there would be no union in person; nor is he a ‘two’ in the neuter, because he is not human nature, though he does have in himself a neuter ‘two’, that is, two natures; therefore he is not in any way a ‘two’.
II. To the Principal Arguments
61. To the first argument for the opposite conclusion [n.51], I say that although Christ is something insofar as he is God and something insofar as he is man, yet it does not follow that ‘therefore insofar as he is man he is the same something that is God’ nor that ‘he is a different something’, because by taking ‘insofar as’ properly, namely as it indicates that what follows is ‘the reason for inherence of the predicate’, there is a fallacy of the consequent, by using ‘insofar as’ in arguing from inherence of a higher predicate to inherence of a lower predicate; for there is no necessity that what is the reason for inherence of a higher predicate be the reason for inherence of a lower one. But as it is, ‘to be the same something that is man’ is lower than anything said of the Word, and likewise ‘to be the same something that is God’ is higher than anything said of man. And so, although Christ is something insofar as he is man, yet it does not follow that ‘therefore insofar as he is man he is the same something that is God’; similarly on the other side, although he is something insofar as he is God yet he is not, insofar as he is God, the same something that is man.a - If however the ‘insofar as’ were taken, not strictly as it states the inherence of a predicate, but only as it states the reason according to which the subject is taken in itself,58 one could concede that Christ, insofar as he is man, is the same something that is God; but then the consequence does not hold that he would be God by humanity, because this consequence does not belong to this second way of understanding the ‘insofar as’ but to the first.
a.a [Interpolation] And if you argue ‘therefore he is another something’, because ‘same’ and ‘diverse’ are first differences of being dividing the whole of being, Metaphysics 10.3.1054b18-19 - the consequence does not hold, because neither of the opposites needs to be present when using the ‘insofar as’; for deity is not the reason for being the same as man, because then the reason for being the same as man would be in the Father, nor is deity the reason for being other than man, because then what it is to be man would be repugnant to deity (which is false, because God is man). Likewise, humanity is not the reason for being the same as God, because then the reason for being the same as God would be in any man, and then every man would be God; nor is humanity the reason for being other than God, because then being the same as God would be repugnant to any man.
62. To the next [n.52] I say that although logic about exclusions added to a predicate [sc. ‘only’ as added to ‘runs’] is not generally passed on,59 perhaps because on the part of the predicate it imports a negation that is, in comparison to the preceding, not determinative (and a syncategorematic term is of a nature to determine one extreme in comparison to the other extreme) - yet, because speech is subject to the thing and not vice versa, one can say that an exclusive phrase excludes in one way when added to the subject and excludes in another way when added to the predicate, because, when added to the subject, it excludes precisely everything with respect to the predicate that the subject is not truly said of either per se or per accidens (to wit, the excluding sentence ‘only a white man runs’ does not exclude ‘Socrates runs’ or ‘a musician runs’ but ‘a black man runs’, though ‘Socrates’ and ‘musician’ are said of ‘white man’ only per accidens); but, when added on the part of the predicate, it excludes with respect to the subject whatever is not formally or essentially said of the predicate - and not conversely [sc. it does not exclude something formally or essentially said of the subject], and especially in the case of the same genus, as that ‘only this is white’ can be excluded because no quality inheres in this subject save whiteness [sc. ‘only a white man runs’ does not entail ‘only this man is white’, because ‘only’ added to the subject is exclusive with respect to the predicate, not the subject].
63. And in this way is it taken in divine reality when this proposition is denied, ‘Christ is man alone and God alone’ [sc. where the ‘alone’ is added to the predicate]; for this proposition is false, not because something is said of Christ that God is not said of [sc. as would be the case if the ‘only’ were added on the part of the subject], but because not everything said of Christ is formally or essentially God (because ‘man’ is said of Christ and yet is not formally God or formally said of God). So this proposition is commonly conceded, that ‘Christ is not only man and not only God’.
64. But from this proposition it does not follow that ‘ 
therefore Christ is other than man or other than God’, but this is a fallacy of the consequent by argument from something with several cause of truth to one of these causes; for, in the issue at hand, the antecedent [sc. ‘Christ is not only man etc 
.’] holds true for this meaning, ‘Christ is not only that which is essentially or formally God’, or for this, ‘Christ is not one who has deity only’ - as if positing the exclusion of an abstract [sc. ‘deity’] understood in the concrete [sc. ‘God’], which is explained as ‘one who has such a form’, according to Damascene ch.57, “For God is one who has divine nature and man one who has human nature.”
65. And so this proposition can be denied, ‘God is only man’, either because the exclusion excludes from a predicate taken formally (because, namely, he is not only that which is formally man), or because it excludes by a form imported in the predicate and not by a supposit having the form (because, namely, he does not have humanity only). The inference made in the statement, ‘therefore he is other than God’, holds true for the second understanding, namely, ‘he is not one who has deity only but also humanity’.
66. And the reason for this diverse way of taking an exclusion in the predicate, not in the subject, could be assigned as that, although the subject supposits for the supposit, yet the predicate predicates a form that is imported in the subject, and not for the supposit.
67. To the statement of Damascene [n.52 footnote], when he says ‘Christ is not wholly God’, this can be expounded syncategorematically [sc. con-significatively] as follows, namely that not both natures are God, or are not the whole formally, namely that what is in Christ is not formally God by both natures.
68. To the next from the Metaphysics [n.53], I concede that in Christ there are numerically two natures; but it does not follow that Christ is numerically two, because Christ is not either of the two natures [sc. Christ is not identical to the species humanity and deity, which would make him a two; he is a supposit that has each species, which makes him a one].
69. To the last argument [n.54] the answer is plain from the same point, because two essences are said to be two in the neuter, but not for this reason is Christ said to be two in the neuter, because he is not the two natures [sc. not identical with them]. Hence if, in order to prove the predicate ‘is two’ of Christ, the natures are taken for the middle term, then: either the major will be false when the natures are signified in the concrete, by taking them thus: ‘God and man are two, Christ is God and man, therefore Christ is two’ (the major here is false, because God is man), or the minor will be false when the natures are signified in the abstract, as if the argument were: ‘humanity and deity are two, Christ is humanity and deity, therefore Christ is two’ (the minor here is false). Or if the natures are taken in the abstract in the major and in the concrete in the minor, there will be four terms, as if the argument were: ‘humanity and deity are two, Christ is God and man, therefore Christ is two’ (here there are four terms: ‘humanity and deity’ and ‘man and God’60), and so nothing will follow.
70. Hereby is plain the answer to the likeness [n.55]: for three persons are one thing because that one thing, which is the nature, is predicated of the three together and of each of them; but if they had something one that was not predicated of them, as if three men had one intellective soul, according to the fiction of Averroes [cf. Ord. 2 d.3 n.164], they would not be said to be something one but to have a one. So here, Christ is not said to be two, although he has in him a two (namely two natures, human and divine), just as neither is a per se composite said to be two, though it has in it a two, namely matter and form.